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Other Misconduct of Expectant
Fathers
N the past decade there has been an unprecedented surge in
state action seeking to protect potential human life. To date,
this activity has chiefly occurred in two fields. One has been
quite fertile, the other barren. A third field awaits significant dis-
covery. This Article will first focus on the two fields recently til-
led, which involve the acts of strangers and the acts of pregnant
women. It will then suggest the need for the exploration of a
third field, the acts of expectant fathers. To certain unborn, preg-
nant dads should owe special duties above those imposed on
strangers. Moreover, unlike expectant mothers, expectant fa-
thers can be more easily assigned special duties because constitu-
tional limits, as well as public policy, reason, and common sense,
present fewer obstacles. At its conclusion, this Article will pro-
pose legal reforms involving expectant fathers based upon on the
recent developments involving strangers and expectant mothers.
I
PROTECTING THE UNBORN IN THE EARLY 1990s
FROM STRANGERS
Laws protecting the unborn can serve a variety of objectives.
Such laws can promote the general public interest in healthy
childbirth by aiding those involved in child begetting and
childbearing to reduce the chances of birth disabilities and to in-
crease the chances of live births.' These laws can also promote
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby Col-
lege, 1970; J.D., University of Chicago, 1974. An early version of this Article was
presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association on May
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I Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the
Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 99-101 (1985).
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the particularized interests of certain individuals (including pro-
spective parents) in securing live and healthy births.2 Although
some courts still have difficulty reconciling the privacy right in-
volving pregnancy termination,3 such laws frequently can be har-
monized with the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.'
The most prevalent and the least controversial laws protecting
the unborn regard the unborn as distinct victims of uninvited
criminal assault or tortious conduct.
Criminal laws protecting the unborn can serve what the Roe
Court called the government's "important and legitimate interest
in protecting the potentiality of human life,"5 without unduly
burdening federal or state constitutional interests. Crimes
against the unborn can cause either pregnancy termination or
disabilities at birth. Both general and particularized interests can
be promoted by laws criminalizing intentional and unintentional
acts. Yet, many states have no such criminal laws. Where crimi-
nal laws do exist, the protection afforded the unborn is often in-
complete in that unintentional acts and acts resulting in birth
disabilities are not covered.6 The lack of laws protecting the un-
born against criminal acts by strangers is especially surprising in
states that otherwise support the interests of the unborn.7 The
unborn are usually better protected under tort laws, where the
viability requirement has been significantly eliminated and where
preconception acts are occasionally covered.'
State failure to enact "an integrated series of criminal stat-
utes"9 protecting the unborn from assaults by strangers fre-
2 1d.
3 Id. at 112-13; see also id. at 113 n.67 (citing cases where state courts misunder-
stood Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) in resolving tort claims); cf. State v. Merrill,
450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn.) (finding Roe did not foreclose state criminal law pro-
tection of embryos and nonviable fetuses), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990).
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5 Id. at 162.
6 Parness, supra note 1, at 146-50.
7 See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 510/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (legislative
pronouncement that the unborn is a human being from the time of conception, enti-
tled to "the right to life"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.0 (West 1992) (long-
standing policy to protect right to life of unborn from conception supports state
abortion law); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1259 (Ill. 1977)
(Dooley, J., concurring) (recognizing a preconception tort claim by a child based
upon negligent medical treatment afforded the mother).
8 See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 357 (I. 1988) (noting the
abandonment of viability as a prerequisite); Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 369
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (reviewing preconception tort cases).
9 Parness, supra note 1, at 166.
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quently immunizes pregnant dads from criminal prosecution for
the intentional harm. caused their unborn offspring. Consider
Karl Andrew Smith10 and Robert Lee Hollis." Smith caused his
wife to miscarry by choking, hitting, and kicking her while shout-
ing "Bleed, baby, bleed."12 Although the relevant statute
criminalized "the unlawful killing of a... fetus with malice afore-
thought,"' 3 a California appeals court misunderstood the deci-
sion in Roe and found, inter alia, that the relevant statute only
applied to a viable fetus.'4 Similarly, Hollis went to the home of
his estranged wife's parents, took his wife to the barn, told her he
did not want the baby she was carrying, and caused the death of
her viable fetus by forcing his hand up her vagina.' 5 The Ken-
tucky Supreme Court read the murder statute to embody the
common law rule that the murder victim must have been born
alive before the murder, 6 a reading that the legislature has not
since overturned 17 though it has urged the override of Roe'" and
otherwise legislated to protect the unborn.'9
Laws criminalizing offenses against the unborn by strangers
have been recently expanded in a few states where an integrated
series of criminal statutes has been adopted. In 1986, the Minne-
sota legislature enacted a scheme providing broad criminal law
protection of the unborn.20 The scheme prohibits premeditated,
intentional, grossly negligent, and negligent acts causing either
the termination of potential human life or disabilities at birth.
These laws were enacted after a Minnesota Supreme Court deci-
sion utilized the common law "born alive" rule to exclude a via-
ble fetus as a victim under the vehicular homicide statute.2'
10 People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
11 Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983).
12 Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
13 Id. at 499 n.1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 187).
14 Id. at 502 (criticized in Parness, supra note 1, at 112-13).
15 Hollis, 652 S.W.2d at 61.
16 Id. at 62. Some members of the court suggested Hollis could be prosecuted for
criminal abortion. Id. at 65. Justice Wintersheimer did not agree such a prosecution
was feasible. See id. at 67 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
17 The born alive rule had been recognized in Kentucky as early as 1936. See id. at
62.
18 H.R. Res. 7, ch. 441, 1978 Ky. Acts 1401.
19 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Michie 1990) (forbidding use of pub-
lic funds for abortions); id. § 311.800 (prohibiting abortions in public health care
facilities).
2 0 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-.269 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
21 State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985).
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Later in 1986, the Illinois General Assembly adopted a similar
statutory scheme, recognizing the unborn as potential victims of
intentional homicide, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary man-
slaughter, reckless homicide, battery, and aggravated battery. 2
In 1987, North Dakota created several new crimes against the
unborn, including murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, ag-
gravated assault, and assault.3 Such new crimes typically apply
to the acts of pregnant dads, so that men such as Karl Smith and
Robert Hollis may be prosecuted. Yet none of the new laws dis-
tinguish expectant fathers from others who harm expectant
mothers and their unborn, though in many other settings the du-
ties of pregnant dads (such as to provide financial support) go
well beyond the duties of other men. These new crimes also usu-
ally do not apply to assaults by pregnant women on their own
unborn.24
While not enacting a comprehensive set of new crimes, a few
states have recently added at least some criminal laws protecting
the unborn from the acts of strangers. For example, the Louisi-
ana legislature in 1989 added three grades of criminal feticide,25
each involving the killing of an unborn and differentiated by the
defendant's state of mind, emotional state, physical state, or in-
volvement in certain felonies. 26 No new laws were added involv-
ing harm to the unborn resulting in birth disabilities. 27  The
22 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, §§ 5/9-1.2, -2.1, -3.2, 5/12-3.1, -4.4 (Smith-Hurd
1993). This Illinois scheme replaced an Illinois feticide law which was far more lim-
ited in its protection of the unborn. The earlier feticide law is critically assessed in
Michael K. Nowak, Comment, Feticide in Illinois: Legislative Amelioration of a
Common Law Rule, 4 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 91 (1983).
23 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to 12.1-17.1-08 (Michie Supp. 1993).
24 For example, the aforementioned Minnesota, Illinois, and North Dakota crimi-
nal laws all exclude pregnant women. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266(b) (West 1987);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, §§ 5/9-1.2(b)(2), (c), -2.1(d), -3.2(c)(2), 5/12-
3.1(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01 (Michie Supp. 1993).
For a discussion of other comparable exemptions, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Arming
the Pregnancy Police: More Outlandish Concoctions?, 53 LA. L. REV. 427, 447-48
(1992).
25 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5-32.8 (West Supp. 1993).
26 See id. § 14:32.6(A)(1) (first degree feticide when offender has "specific intent
to kill or to inflict great bodily harm"); id. § 14:32.7(A)(1) (second degree feticide
defined as involving first degree conduct, but where the offense is "committed in
sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation of the
mother"); id. § 14:32.8(A) (third degree feticide when there is criminal negligence,
or a vehicle driver under the influence of alcohol or narcotic drugs); id.
§ 14:32.6(A)(2) (first degree feticide when offender engaged in aggravated forcible
rape, certain robberies, or other designated crimes).
27 It is possible that existing criminal laws on assaults and the like might cover
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incomplete criminal law protection of the unborn in Louisiana is
puzzling given the state legislature's otherwise strong commit-
ment to potential life protection and its continuing efforts to un-
dercut Roe.' In 1987, the Washington legislature redefined the
crime of assault in the second degree to include acts harming an
unborn quick child.29 Again, pregnant dads received no special
attention and pregnant women were not covered in these laws.
In the past decade, the need for an integrated series of criminal
laws protecting the unborn from strangers may have lessened
due to the expansion of civil laws that seek to deter, prevent,
remedy, or punish the acts of strangers who harm the unborn.
Broad new tort laws cover various forms of conduct uninvited by
expectant mothers, such as injuries to the unborn caused by neg-
ligent preconception conduct 30 or the negligent exposure of a
pregnant woman to hazardous substances in the workplace.3'
such injuries because the "born alive" rule would be met. See State v. Gyles, 313 So.
2d 799 (La. 1975) (providing that assault on a pregnant woman could lead to a mur-
der conviction in the death of the injured fetus only if the fetus was born alive and
subsequently died). Yet, other difficulties with such prosecutions remain, including
problems with mens rea requirements, defendants' due process rights to be informed
unambiguously about the types of conduct which may trigger criminal prosecution,
and legislative intent. Regarding legislative intent, see for example, Johnson v.
State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (legislative history of statute did not show intent to
use the term "delivery" in the prosecution of a mother for delivery of a controlled
substance to a minor via the umbilical cord), State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916, 917 (La.
1980) (strict construction of penal statutes and preference for "separate enactments"
dealing with harm to fetuses), and People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.),
appeal denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991) (pregnant woman's cocaine use not
prosecutable under delivery-of-cocaine statute).
28 See Sojourner T v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992) (invalidating the Loui-
siana Abortion Statute of 1991, which would have criminalized most abortions in the
state), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1414 (1993); Parness, supra note 1, at 132.
29 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.021(1)(b) (West Supp. 1993). Consider also
N.M. STAT. ANNr. § 30-3-7 (Michie 1993) (third degree felony if injury to a pregnant
woman involves miscarriage or stillbirth resulting from commission of a felony) and
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie 1987) (third degree felony if "[i]njury to preg-
nant woman by vehicle" involves miscarriage or stillbirth resulting from unlawful
operation of a motor vehicle by a person other than the pregnant woman).
3 0 See Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 445
N.W.2d 441 (Mich. 1989) (allowing preconception tort claim against physician who
failed to immunize mother for rubella). But see Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570
N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991) (dismissal of preconception tort claim in DES setting), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 197 (1991).
31 See, e.g., Namislo v. Akzo Chems., Inc., 620 So. 2d 573 (Ala. 1993) (finding
Alabama's workers' compensation statute did not bar in utero injury claim); Thomp-
son v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act provided no barrier to recovery, though it provided the
exclusive remedy for claimant's mother).
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Also the protection offered potential human life under tort law
principles is more complete than under criminal statutes. Ac-
tions in tort eliminate distinctions between viable and previable
fetuses and, in a few jurisdictions, recognize claims for precon-
ception acts. Yet, recognition of a particular child's tort claims
for birth disabilities does little to express the general societal out-
rage over the acts of a Karl Smith or a Robert Hollis. Thus, the
need remains for an integrated series of criminal statutes protect-
ing the unborn from the acts of strangers.32
II
PROTECTING THE UNBORN IN THE EARLY 1990s
FROM PREGNANT WOMEN
Notwithstanding the fact that the new crimes against the un-
born do not address the conduct of pregnant women, the past
decade has witnessed an explosion of attempted criminal prose-
cutions of women for harm caused to their unborn during preg-
nancy, as well as a surge of laws covering the reporting and
testing responsibilities of medical personnel and others who at-
tend pregnant women. Simultaneously, there have been slowly
emerging civil law reforms involving prebirth maternal responsi-
bilities to the unborn. Unlike the attempted criminal prosecu-
tions of Smith and Hollis and the new criminal laws involving
strangers, efforts focusing on pregnant women frequently raise
troubling questions about the individualized interests of expec-
32 Identifying strangers to the unborn can be difficult. Consider some crimes
which protect the unborn, at least in part, and involve those who provide pregnant
women with health care and other assistance. Exemplary is a new Illinois law which
requires certain health care professionals and others to report to the Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) anyone reasonably thought to be a "neglected
child," defined to include a newborn infant exposed to a controlled substance, unless
exposure occurs as "the result of medical treatment administered to the mother or
the newborn infant." Failure to report may constitute a Class A misdemeanor. ILL.
COMP. STAT. Ar'. ch. 325, §§ 5/3, 5/4 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (also requiring reports
from social workers, law enforcement officers, and DCFS personnel; physicians are
subject to disciplinary board referrals rather than to criminal prosecution). Under a
related new Class B misdemeanor, a county clerk will face criminal penalties if she
fails to provide a pamphlet describing the causes and effects of fetal alcohol syn-
drome with any marriage license she issues. Id. §§ 5/203(3), 5/215. As with crimes
involving acts of pregnant women, these laws also address conduct which now seems
best left primarily to civil law. Cf. Paul A. Logli, The Prosecutor's Role in Solving
the Problems of Prenatal Drug Use and Substance Abused Children, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 559, 561-66 (1992).
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tant parents,33 of parents of children born alive,34 of the un-
born,35 and of born children 36 themselves, as well as about the
social consequences of laws governing prebirth maternal
conduct.37
Recent attempted criminal prosecutions of women who
harmed their unborn during pregnancy have been pursued
mainly under older criminal laws that fail specifically to include
pregnant women as perpetrators of crime or to include the un-
born as victims of crime. Three of the more publicized cases are
illustrative. One involved the 1989 attempted prosecution of Me-
lanie Green in Illinois for the involuntary manslaughter of her
daughter Bianca, who died two days after birth due to "oxygen
deprivation linked to cocaine exposure late in pregnancy. '38 The
prosecution failed when a grand jury refused to indict; some
grand jury members were concerned both with Melanie's right to
privacy and with the application of the general criminal man-
slaughter statute to Melanie's conduct.39 The new Illinois crime
of involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child, enacted in 1986,
was inapplicable because pregnant women were excluded as po-
tential defendants.' The second case involved the 1988 at-
tempted prosecution of Tammy Gray in Ohio for the
endangerment of her daughter Sierra,4' who suffered "serious
physical harm" at birth due to Tammy's "ingestion of cocaine in
33 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (protecting a woman's right to
privacy). On the interest of would-be, but not yet expectant, parents, see for exam-
ple, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (protecting a man's right to
procreate).
34 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents").
35 See, e.g., ILL. CoMP. STAT. Ar'NN. ch. 720, § 510/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (within
limits of Roe, state policy is "to protect the right to life of the unborn child from
conception").
36 See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-44 (1977)
(recognizing child's interests in being reared within a family unit, even where there
are no biological relationships). At times, the child's interest may differ from the
interests of other family members. Id. at 857 n.1 (Stewart, J., concurring).
37 See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 114 (1989); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The
Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1988).
38 Mother Charged After Her Baby Dies of Cocaine, N.Y. TIMEs, May 10, 1989, at
A18.
39 Isabel Wilkerson, Jury in Illinois Refuses to Charge Mother in Drug Death of
Newborn, N.Y. TIMEs, May 27, 1989, at A10 (paraphrasing the state's attorney).
40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/9-3.2(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
41 State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
the third trimester of her pregnancy." 42 The relevant criminal
statute prohibited creating a substantial risk to the health or
safety of a "child under eighteen years of age. ' 43 The Ohio
Supreme Court found the statute inapplicable, expressing con-
cern that the law did not specifically include harm to the un-
born" and that the state legislature was then considering a bill
creating a new crime of prenatal child neglect.4 The third case
demonstrates that even where there is a statute designed to cover
prenatal maternal acts, criminal prosecution may still fail. In
1986, Pamela Rae Stewart was charged with misdemeanor child
abuse for failing to furnish medical services to her child.' The
relevant statute defined child as including one "conceived but
not yet born. ' 47 Specifically, Pamela allegedly disregarded a
physician's advice regarding her amphetamine use, sex life, and
medical care during pregnancy, which caused her child to be born
with brain damage and to die less than two months after birth.4'
The charge was dismissed by the trial judge, who found the stat-
ute was not intended to penalize pregnant women for conduct
during pregnancy,49 but rather was intended to penalize parents
for failing to support their children financially. 50 The generally
applicable criminal child abuse statute was unavailable due to
precedent indicating its protection did not extend to the
unborn.5'
The surge in attempted criminal prosecutions of women for
prenatal conduct under older criminal laws, as well as related
calls for new laws which would specifically address crimes involv-
ing prenatal maternal conduct, have met significant opposition
5 2
which is unlikely to abate. The push to expand the criminal lia-
42 Id. at 710.
43 Id. at 711.
44 Id. ("where the concerns of the unborn are at issue, the legislature and adminis-
trative bodies have referred to the unborn specifically").
45 Id. at 712-13.
46 Marcia Chambers, Dead Baby's Mother Faces Criminal Charge on Acts in Preg-
nancy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1986, at A22.
47 CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988).
48 Note, supra note 37, at 994.
49 Marcia Chambers, Charges Against Mother in Death of Baby Thrown Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1987, at A25.
50 Note, supra note 37, at 994 n.1.
51 Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that
when the legislature seeks to protect the unborn via criminal law, it does so
expressly).
52 See, e.g., Field, supra note 37; Note, supra note 37.
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bility of pregnant women for harming their unborn should dissi-
pate, if not disappear, in the next decade. 3 Evidence of this
dissipation is suggested by the continuing exemption of pregnant
women from the criminal abortion laws enacted by some of the
most vehement anti-abortion legislatures.5 4 Too many people
now believe "public policy, reason and common sense ''5 5 dictate
that such criminal prosecutions be abandoned. They believe
criminal prosecutions turn women away from seeking prenatal
care, discourage them from providing accurate information to
health care providers, unwittingly increase the incidence of abor-
tion, and are ineffective in curing drug dependency or preventing
substance abuse. 6 Moreover, the recent wave of attempted
criminal prosecutions of women has been tainted by racial and
economic discrimination,5 7 so that abandonment of new prosecu-
tions is urged even by those sympathetic to criminal proceedings,
at least until such biases can be eliminated. Finally, recent at-
tempts to prosecute pregnant women have usually involved the
goals of rehabilitation and general deterrence, rather than pun-
ishment, 9 which are aims that can also be achieved through new
53 This dissipation should occur even if federal and state constitutional interests
could be accommodated. Among the relevant interests are unreasonable distinc-
tions based on poverty, race, and/or drug addiction, as well as privacy interests in
procreation, child begetting, childrearing, and the like. A good, early statement on
guidelines for state regulation of pregnant women in their first trimester is found in
John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 447 n.129 (1983).
54 Thus, in Louisiana, where there is a longstanding policy to protect an unborn
child from the moment of conception, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.0 (West
1992), and where three forms of feticide were added in 1989, see id. §§ 14:32.6-.8
(West Supp. 1993), the legislative attempt in the 1990s to eliminate abortion rights
was grounded on a criminal abortion law that exempted women seeking or procur-
ing abortions from criminal liability, see id. § 14:87 (West Supp. 1993) (invalidated in
Sojourner, 974 F.2d at 29-30). See generally Samuel W. Buell, Note, Criminal Abor-
tion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774 (1991) (contemporary criminal abortion laws
which exempt pregnant women are incoherent, lack sound policy justification, and
are founded on a deeply rooted paternalism); Jean Rosenbluth, Note, Abortion as
Murder: Why Should Women Get Off. Using Scare Tactics to Preserve Choice, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1237 (1993) (suggesting that laws exempting pregnant women from
criminal abortion laws violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
55 Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1297 (Fla. 1992).
56 Id. at 1295-96.
57 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Wo-
men of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1421 n.6
(1991).
58 Parness, supra note 24, at 447.
59 In Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1290, perhaps the most publicized case in which there
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civil law developments.'
A variety of new civil laws do address harm caused the unborn
by pregnant women outside of consensual abortions. While
there has been little interest to date in expanding the tort law
duties of pregnant women,61 there are new laws which promote
research into the ways pregnant women may protect their un-
born.62 New laws also educate the populace, 63 or prospective
parents in particular,' about the adverse consequences on the
unborn flowing from certain conduct during pregnancy, as well as
afford increased prenatal care opportunities to pregnant women
involved in drug or alcohol abuse.65 More controversial new civil
laws help the government to identify pregnant women who have
been, or are, involved in drug or alcohol abuse;' permit the gov-
ernment to coerce certain pregnant women into treatment
designed, in part, to protect potential human life;67 and permit
was a conviction at trial, the parties agreed that rehabilitation of the defendant and
protection of her children were the intended goals, and the woman was sentenced to
a year of community control in a drug rehabilitation program, followed by fourteen
years probation. Kristen Barret, Comment, Prosecuting Pregnant Addicts for Deal-
ing to the Unborn, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 221, 237 n.143 (1991).
60 See, e.g., Logli, supra note 32, at 561-66. Logli, the would-be prosecutor of Me-
lanie Green, see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text, emphasizes nonpunitive,
state-initiated civil proceedings in most settings, with criminal prosecution appropri-
ate only where drug treatment for pregnant women is readily available. Logli, supra
note 32, at 561-66.
61 See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Iil. 1988) (rejecting infant's
claim against mother for unintentional prenatal injuries). But see Barnes v. Barnes,
603 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. 1992) (denying parental immunity for intentional felonious
acts, here involving rape by a father); Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992)
(three-two decision recognizing child's claim against mother for prenatal injuries).
62 See, e.g., ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, § 305/4-103 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (requir-
ing creation of model programs for the care and treatment of addicted pregnant
women).
63 See, e.g., id. ch. 235, § 5/6-24a (based on the need for "public information,"
sellers of alcohol required to post signs warning of the risks of birth defects caused
by alcohol consumption during pregnancy); id. ch. 20, § 2310/55.52 (creating a public
education program to reduce the prenatal transmission of HIV infection).
64 See, e.g., id. ch. 750, § 5/203 (requiring a pamphlet on fetal alcohol syndrome be
distributed with each marriage license).
65 See, e.g., id. ch. 305, § 5/5-5 (pregnant public aid recipients suspected of drug
abuse or addiction referred to treatment where cost is covered and no sanctions
imposed); id. ch. 20, § 305/9-101 (Department of Children and Family Services to
give priority to pregnant women in residential drug and alcohol treatment centers).
66 See, e.g., id. ch. 325, §§ 5/3, 5/4 (reports to child welfare agency of newborns
exposed to controlled substance required of various health care workers and others);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.556(2)(c), (3), 626.5561 (West Supp. 1993) (reports of
pregnant women using controlled substances to be made to the state).
67 See, e.g., MirN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561(2) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for
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conduct during a pregnancy to serve as a basis for suspension or
termination of parental rights.68
The controversies over such civil laws have just begun and in-
volve many of the same questions raised over the criminal prose-
cution of pregnant women. Will mandatory reporting laws
covering drug use during pregnancy deter many women from
seeking prenatal care, thereby causing more harm than good?69
Will laws coercing drug treatment for pregnant women unwit-
tingly increase the incidence of abortion, thereby undermining
one of the very goals (potential life protection) sought to be pro-
moted?70 Will efforts to terminate maternal rights based upon
conduct during pregnancy necessarily be tainted with the race
and class biases that have accompanied the attempted criminal
prosecutions of pregnant women?71 No crystal ball is needed to
predict that during the next decade, there will be more wide-
spread debate over these questions.
"emergency admission" of pregnant woman who "refuses recommended voluntary
services or fails recommended treatment").
68 See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 705, § 405/2-3 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (newborn
exposed to controlled substances is a neglected child); id. § 405/2-5 (law enforce-
ment officer may, without warrant, take into temporary custody a minor reasonably
believed to be a neglected child); id. § 405/2-10 (temporary custody hearing can re-
sult in "the removal of the minor from his or her home").
69 See Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Preg-
nant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 213-14 (1989) ("Fear of
prosecution will ... deter substance-dependent women from seeking ... prenatal
care."); Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the
Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 535 (1992)
(arguing that reporting laws will "create a profound disincentive for pregnant drug
users to seek health care").
70 Oberman, supra note 69, at 522.
71 See, e.g., Logli, supra note 32, at 565 (noting "legitimate concerns" regarding
"racial and economic imbalance in the women being referred.., as substance abus-
ing mothers," and advocating a "universal testing of newborns or a testing method
using consistently applied objective protocols"); Roberts, supra note 57, at 1432-36
(bias against poor blacks found in testing of pregnant women and newborns for ex-
posure to illegal drugs and alcohol).
In addition to problems of race and class bias, allowing evidence of certain con-
duct during pregnancy may, in a maternal rights hearing, make culprits of many
victims, as studies suggest that physical or sexual abuse of women during pregnancy
is not uncommon. See Michael Campbell, Study: 17% of Pregnant Women Abused,
CHI. TRIB., June 18, 1992, § 1, at 6. Evidence also suggests that female drug addicts
"often have histories of sexual, physical and emotional abuse." Wendy Chavkin et
al., Drug-Using Families and Child Protection: Results of a Study and Implications
for Change, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 295, 297 (1992).
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III
THE NEXT DECADE: PROTECTING THE UNBORN
FROM PREGNANT DADS
A crystal ball is necessary, however, to predict whether there
will soon be widespread debate over new laws addressing harm
caused the unborn by pregnant dads. While attempted criminal
prosecutions of expectant fathers has not accompanied the surge
in prosecutions of expectant mothers, clearly the prebirth pater-
nal acts of pregnant dads such as Karl Smith and Robert Hollis
should be subject to prosecution. Special criminal statutes di-
rected at pregnant dads should be adopted. Furthermore, recent
civil law reforms directed at reducing harmful prebirth paternal
conduct should be recognized more widely and should be
expanded.
New laws on prebirth paternal conduct seem appropriate as
there is today, unfortunately, much harm caused to the unborn
by pregnant dads. Proscribed activities in new laws should ex-
tend far beyond the conduct of Karl Smith or Robert Hollis, em-
bodying acts which may fall outside the ambit of an integrated
series of criminal statutes protecting potential human life and,
thus, inside the ambit of new civil statutes and administrative reg-
ulations. Consider the expectant father who may have knowingly
supplied a pregnant Melanie Green with the cocaine that led to
Bianca's death,7 2 or the future dad who may have endangered
Sierra by knowingly supplying a pregnant Tammy Gray with co-
caine. Further, consider the expectant father who joined Pamela
Rae Stewart in disregarding her doctor's advice about sex during
pregnancy.
The exploration of new criminal and civil laws governing
prebirth paternal acts can begin with a Florida case which shows
how existing criminal child abuse and neglect laws might be
72 In fact, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/124.7 (Smith-Hurd 1993), provides:
"Any person who violates.., the Illinois Controlled Substances Law by unlawfully
delivering a controlled substance to another commits the offense of drug induced
infliction of great bodily harm if any person experiences great bodily harm ... as a
result of the ... ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance."
There is also the possible use of aiding or abetting laws against pregnant dads
when their mates act criminally. See, e.g., People v. Peters, 586 N.E.2d 469 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (mother aided boyfriend in murdering her son, where boyfriend killed son
outside mother's presence and where mother had no specific intent to facilitate the
abuse of her son); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) (failure to provide
prebirth financial support); Note, supra note 37, at 994.
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adapted to the conduct of expectant fathers. The recent Florida
Supreme Court decision in In Re Adoption of Doe73 involved the
prebirth child care provided by an unwed, biological father. The
father sought to participate in an adoption proceeding com-
menced by a couple who had assumed custody of his son shortly
after birth. Under state law, the father's right to participate
hinged, in part, on whether he had abandoned his son before, or
shortly after, birth.74 The court found abandonment prior to
birth, relying chiefly on the father's failure to evince "a settled
purpose to assume parental duties."75 In particular, the father
was found not to have provided his son's mother with "meaning-
ful, repetitive and customary support" prior to birth,76 including
a failure to pay "monies toward prenatal medical bills, food, or
medications."77 In determining that the father had no right to
participate in the adoption case, the court spoke in more general
terms of prebirth paternal duties. It said:
Because prenatal care of the pregnant mother and unborn
child is critical ... the biological father, wed or unwed, has a
responsibility to provide support during the prebirth period.
Respondent natural father's argument that he has no parental
responsibility prior to birth ... is not a norm that society is
prepared to recognize. Such an argument is legally, morally,
and socially indefensible.78
While the goals behind establishing maternal and paternal du-
ties to the unborn may be comparable, their implementation ob-
viously will differ. The Florida Supreme Court did not elaborate
on, or urge the legislature to address more fully, the nature of
prebirth paternal duties in adoption proceedings. Nor did the
73 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989).
74 Id. at 745. Once abandonment occurred, it could not be overcome easily in
Florida. In this case, the father "filed an acknowledgment of paternity" only a week
after birth, about four days after the couple hoping to adopt his son assumed cus-
tody, and over a month before the adoption petition was filed. Id. The father's
attempt to gain custody coincided with both the mother's reconciliation with (and
later marriage to) the father, and with her attempt to withdraw her consent to the
adoption five days after it was given. These events occurred more than one month
before the adoption petition was filed. Id. at 743; cf. In re Adoption of J.R.G., 617
N.E.2d 377 (111. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that biological father was unfit under statute
because he failed to demonstrate responsibility for the child's welfare within 30 days
after birth, and thus his consent was not required in his child's adoption).
75 Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d at 747.
76 Id. at 747 n.3 (adopting the trial court findings found in In re Adoption of Doe,
524 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
77 Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d at 747 n.3 (adopting trial court finding).
78 Id. at 746.
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court discuss prebirth paternal duties applicable to criminal con-
duct, financial support, or suspension of parental rights cases not
involving an adoption. It should be noted that Florida recently
did seek to protect the unborn from prenatal maternal drug use
by enacting mandatory reporting laws covering newborns physi-
cally dependent upon drugs, as well as mothers who used a con-
trolled substance during pregnancy.79 Florida officials also
recently undertook the criminal prosecution of Jennifer Johnson
for transmitting illegal drugs through the umbilical cord.'
In considering civil and criminal laws governing pregnant dads,
attention must be paid to the two major types of expectant fa-
thers under law: biological fathers and presumed fathers. Not all
biological fathers have legal obligations or rights regarding their
offspring, therefore, only certain expectant biological fathers
should be assigned prebirth paternal duties. For example, in set-
tings involving artificial insemination through an anonymous do-
nor where the pregnant woman's husband has consented, the
donor typically has no legally recognized parental interests. Pre-
sumed fathers have legal duties, but no biological connection, to
their future offspring."1 Generally, men married to women who
conceive, carry, or bear children during the marriage are pre-
sumed fathers under law, though the presumption may, but need
not, be rebuttable.8
In focusing on the prebirth duties of prospective fathers, the
lessons from recent prebirth stranger and maternal conduct cases
should be applied. The likes of Karl Smith and Robert Hollis
clearly should be subject to criminal prosecution for harming
their unborn offspring, with the charges extending beyond any
crimes addressing the harm caused their former mates. Worthy
of enactment are special statutes addressing the harmful conduct
79 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(a)(2), (g) (West 1993) (defining harm to child's
health or welfare); id. § 415.504(1) (mandatory reporting duty).
80 Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
81 In Illinois, the husband of a pregnant woman is legally presumed to be the
father of a child if the child is born or conceived during that marriage. This pre-
sumption may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 45/5 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
82 Compare id. ch. 750, § 4517(b) (action to declare nonexistence of parent/child
relationship may be brought by presumed father) with LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 188
(West 1993) (in absence of mother's fraud, man may not disavow paternity if he
married knowing that his bride was pregnant) and B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368
(N.D. 1993) (man who had sex with a woman shortly before her wedding has no
standing to assert paternity of a child born seven months after the wedding).
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of pregnant dads toward their unborn. In the alternative, general
statutes embodying crimes against the unborn could carry en-
hanced penalties if the defendant is the prospective father of the
unborn victim. 83 Everyone now has duties under criminal laws
not to cause certain harm. However, for those who are parents
of the children who are victims, such duties are usually greater.
Should the expectant father of Pamela Rae Stewart's fetus be
prosecuted separately for 1) harming his unborn child if he sup-
plied Pamela with illegal amphetamines, 2) joining her in disre-
garding her doctor's advice about sex during pregnancy, or 3)
failing to help pay for Pamela's medical expenses during preg-
nancy, even if such acts would not result in similar criminal pros-
ecution of persons who were not pregnant dads? There is much
to commend at least the first and third forms of special criminal
prosecution.' In fact, Pamela Rae lived "with a violent, abusive
husband, who beat her and regularly threatened her and other
family members.
85
Potential life protection would be especially well-promoted by
a few well-considered prosecutions of such pregnant dads.
Though convictions did not follow, the recent criminal prosecu-
tions for prebirth maternal conduct have served "the educational
function of criminal law."'86 Comparably, the prosecution of a
few men would better assure an increasing awareness that, as the
Florida Supreme Court noted, the absence of male "parental re-
sponsibility prior to birth . . . is not a norm that society is pre-
pared to recognize."'87
The failure of pregnant dads to financially support their un-
83 An issue not addressed here involves whether criminal action should be pun-
ished differently if there is a presumed father (the man married to the mother) who
is not the biological father. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 500 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976) (concerning a husband's attack on his pregnant wife motivated by his
belief that she had "interracial intercourse" outside the marriage).
84 The trial court in Pamela Rae's case, People v. Stewart (Cal. Mun. Ct. 1987),
acknowledged the criminal liability of fathers who refuse to pay pregnancy expenses.
See Note, supra note 37, at 994; see also text accompanying note 50. Supplying the
mother with illegal drugs may already be actionable under existing general criminal
law-assuming a child is born alive. See supra note 27.
85 Oberman, supra note 69, at 506. Professor Oberman opined that the father
bore "some responsibility" for the prenatal harm, but further said (wrongfully, I
hope) that laws directed at the substance abuse of expectant fathers "would never be
permitted" because they would cover the "white middle class" (and men). Id. at
506, 534.
86 Parness, supra note 1, at 163-65.
87 In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964
(1989).
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born need not only be considered after birth during criminal
prosecutions,m or during pre-adoption hearings involving issues
of child abandonment. 89 Prebirth financial support should be
considered in postbirth settings beyond adoption, including mar-
riage dissolution and male-initiated paternity actions raising cus-
tody or visitation issues, as well as in settings prior to birth where
harm to the unborn may still be prevented.
One way to prevent harm is to expand opportunities for pater-
nity actions brought by expectant mothers so that expectant fa-
thers can be compelled to provide needed financial support for
their unborn.' Unfortunately, such actions are now usually un-
available. Even when prebirth paternity actions are filed, typi-
cally the proceedings are stayed until after birth.91 Such prebirth
paternal support can extend beyond money supplied to pregnant
women to include such important matters as insurance coverage.
Further, the recognition of tort claims by children against their
fathers for prebirth conduct resulting in birth disabilities92 would
seemingly help prevent birth disabilities, and involve different
public policy concerns than are involved in claims by children
against strangers or against their birthmothers. 93 Expectant fa-
thers have special relationships with their future offspring which
many strangers do not have, and yet these fathers do not possess
as many constitutional interests in prebirth activities as do expec-
tant mothers. At the least, a compelling case can be made for
88 See supra text accompanying note 50.
89 See Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d at 741.
90 Expanded opportunities for prebirth paternity support orders sought by the
state for reimbursement of expenditures made on behalf of the unborn are more
troubling and are not addressed herein. Also unaddressed are expanded opportuni-
ties for prebirth paternity actions initiated by men, which seemingly would be wel-
comed by some expectant fathers and unwelcomed by many expectant mothers.
91 Stays are usually either automatic, see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-6(d) (1992);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 584-6(d) (Supp. 1992), or at the man's request, see, e.g., ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 276 (West 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-19 (1973). But
in Delaware, a prebirth paternity action is automatically stayed except for support
proceedings. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 805(d) (Michie Supp. 1992). In Arkansas, a
paternity court may issue temporary orders pending birth. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-
103(a) (Michie 1991).
92 Prebirth conduct even may include, at times, preconception conduct, as there is,
for example, evidence of the harmful effect of damaged sperm. See, e.g., Paternal-
Fetal Conflict, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 3 (also noting the March
of Dimes campaign, whose slogan is "Men have babies, too.").
93 To date, similar claims against strangers have been expanding, while claims




children's claims against expectant fathers involving prebirth acts
constituting intentional felonious conduct.94
Yet another way to prevent harm to the unborn caused by the
acts of pregnant dads is to allow for greater access to prebirth
protection orders on behalf of the unborn. Because all women
themselves can already secure protection orders requiring poten-
tial abusers to stay away,95 fetal protection orders against preg-
nant dads could seek to prevent harm to the unborn by
addressing such conduct as facilitating access to prenatal care,
food, and shelter; helping the expectant mother to comply with
doctor's orders; and providing financial support or insurance.
These orders may be comparable to, but distinct from, orders in
any expanded version of a traditional paternity action.96 Addi-
tionally, these orders could be issued in settings where the expec-
tant parents otherwise do not owe one another any duty of
support. For example, fetal protection orders might issue against
those in quasi-paternal (or quasi-parental) settings. Consider, for
example, protection orders involving men (or women) who are
neither biological nor presumed fathers (or mothers), but who
nevertheless have developed a special relationship with, or have
assumed parental duties toward, the unborn. Exemplary may be
the prospective parents of a child born through a surrogacy
agreement.97
Finally, new prebirth paternal conduct laws should include re-
forms whose chief goals are to educate men and others on the
ways to protect potential human life. Thus, as information is
conveyed in some states to pregnant women regarding drug use
94 Barnes v. Barnes, 603 N.E.2d 1337 (Ind. 1992) (reviewing parental tort immu-
nity and finding it would be abrogated in circumstances involving intentional feloni-
ous acts).
95 Of course, stay away orders may be easier for pregnant women to obtain. See,
e.g., Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (allowing a pregnant
woman, who had been assaulted earlier by her husband, to obtain an order of pro-
tection on behalf of her fetus of four months, and observing that it "ha[d] seen a
significant number of cases where physical abuse of an expectant mother by her
husband is consciously directed at her unborn child").
96 Fetal protection orders against pregnant dads are comparable to, but raise
fewer problems than, fetal protection orders involving pregnant women. See, e.g.,
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561 (West 1993) (coerced treatment of pregnant women).
See generally Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1519, 1556 (1990) (state intervention during pregnancy).
97 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (validating certain surrogacy
agreements).
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during pregnancy, 98 information should also be delivered to preg-
nant dads about the duties of biological and presumed father-
hood. Further, as women seeking abortions are informed by
their doctors of the state's interest in promoting childbirth, all
pregnant women should also be informed of the prebirth support
duties of expectant fathers.99 And, as there was much recent at-
tention to fetal protection policies affecting fertile women in the
workplace, there should be increased attention to fetal protec-
tion policies affecting fertile male workers. 1°°
CONCLUSION
There has been much recent discussion about criminal and tor-
tious conduct against the unborn by strangers, and about the
criminal and civil law duties of pregnant women toward their fu-
ture offspring. To date, however, there has been only limited dis-
cussion of laws involving the prebirth acts of pregnant dads.
More talk about the legal duties of expectant fathers is needed,
to be followed by some tilling and harvesting of new laws pro-
tecting potential human life. While discussion should be guided
by the recent dialogue about laws on prebirth stranger and ma-
ternal conduct, differences in constitutional interests and social
consequences suggest that quite different legal treatment be ac-
corded prebirth paternal acts. New civil and criminal laws ad-
dressing the duties of pregnant dads are needed.' 01
98 See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, § 2310/55.54 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
("[sitatewide education program to inform pregnant women of the medical conse-
quences of alcohol, drug and tobacco use and abuse").
99 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2822 (1992) (in upholding Penn-
sylvania informed consent law, Court sustained requirement that doctors inform
pregnant women of materials providing information about a father's child support
duties).
100 See, e.g., Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 388 (1991) (reviewing UAW
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) and concluding: "Employers who
are concerned that their workplaces might be found unreasonably dangerous in a
negligence action must formulate fetal protection policies that address health risks
associated with paternal as well as maternal exposure to toxins.").
101 1 recognize my failure to address the prebirth conduct of expectant mothers
who are not destined to be biological moms. I thus leave for another day a more
general discussion of the duties of all expectant parents. See, e.g., Adoption of
Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (lesbian may adopt her mate's biological
child); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App.) (concerning the possible joint
custody of a child by two women, taking into consideration their co-parenting agree-
ment and the child's best interest), cert. denied, 827 P.2d 837 (N.M. 1992).
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